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COMMA BUT DIFFERENTIATED
RESPONSIBILITIES: PUNCTUATION AND
30 OTHER WAYS NEGOTIATORS HAVE
RESOLVED ISSUES IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
CHANGE REGIME
Susan Biniaz*
ABSTRACT
International climate change negotiations have a long history of being con-
tentious, and much has been written about the grand trade-offs that have allowed
countries to reach agreement.  Issues have often involved, for example, the level of
ambition, differentiated treatment of Parties, and various forms of financial assis-
tance to developing countries.
Lesser known are the smaller, largely language-based tools negotiators have
used to resolve differences, sometimes finding a solution as subtle as a shift in the
placement of a comma.  These tools have operated in different ways.  Some, such
as deliberate imprecision or postponement, have “resolved” an issue by sidestep-
ping it and allowing Parties to preserve their positions.  Other tools have enabled
resolution by “splitting the difference” between opposing views.  Still others have
involved optical fixes, flexibility, or non-prejudice that helped one or more Parties
go along with a particular outcome.
This compendium of textual examples, presented in rough chronological or-
der, is drawn from my personal involvement in international climate negotiations
and is by no means exhaustive.  The examples may be of interest to those who
follow climate change in particular, as well as of potential use to those who work
in other international fields.
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I. IDENTIFYING ISSUES
Climate change negotiations were controversial even before the formal
negotiations began.  The first task of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) was to report on the science and impacts associated
with climate change, as well as on potential response strategies.  In its 1990
report, the IPCC included, among potential responses, the development of
a framework convention on climate change and the “possible elements” of
such a convention.1
Participants were unable to agree on the elements, both because they
had substantive disagreements and because they did not want to prejudice
1. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change: IPCC Response
Stategies, ¶ 261–62 (1990), http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_III/ipcc_far_wg_III_full
_report.pdf.
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their respective countries’ positions during a future negotiation of such a
convention.  The solution was to frame the elements as a set of issues.
The issues were not agreed, but rather represented more of a collection
of proposed issues.  Nevertheless, many were helpfully specific, such as “in
view of the interrelationship among all greenhouse gases, their sources and
sinks, should they be treated collectively?”  They were also well-organized,
divided into sections called “preamble,” “general obligations,” “institutions,”
“research, systematic observations, and analysis,” “information exchange and
reporting,” “development and transfer of technology,” “settlement of dis-
putes,” “other provisions,” and “annexes and protocols.”  As a result, the
IPCC’s identification of issues, while disappointing at the time, proved to
be an excellent resource for negotiators when the time came to develop an
actual framework convention.
II. “CONSTRUCTIVE” AMBIGUITY
It may seem counterintuitive to the outside world that negotiators
would ever deliberately draft a formulation that admits of two different
interpretations.  After all, they should in theory aim for clarity, particularly
when preparing legal instruments.  However, clarity is not always an op-
tion, and the alternative to ambiguity may be failure to reach agreement.  In
some cases, negotiators may consider no agreement preferable to the risks
inherent in perpetuating opposing interpretations.  In those cases where
ambiguity is preferable, though, its use is considered “constructive.”
One of the first examples of constructive ambiguity in the climate ne-
gotiations was the way in which countries tackled an issue that arose at the
very end of the negotiation of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (the “Convention”).  Negotiators had already agreed that
the Convention would contain a list of Parties with certain heightened re-
sponsibilities, including more detailed reporting.  The “Annex I” list would
include the members of the OECD at that time, plus the former Soviet
bloc.  The outstanding issue was how to characterize the Annex I Parties in
the Convention provisions that referred to them:
• For many countries, it would have been acceptable, even desira-
ble, to simply say “The Parties listed in Annex I . . .  ,” without
further characterization.
• For others, it was important to describe the Annex I Parties as
“developed country Parties.”  However, Russia would not agree
to characterize itself as a “developed country.”
The fact that the “European Economic Community” (which was not a
“country”) was on the list provided the solution.  Negotiators hit upon the
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formulation “the developed country Parties and other Parties included in
Annex I.”2  Russia would be able to consider itself within the group of
“other Parties,” while others would be able to say that Russia was a “devel-
oped country” and that “other Parties” was included only for the purposes of
describing the non-country European Economic Community.
The Convention negotiators also used constructive ambiguity when ad-
dressing the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities” (CBDR/RC).  To followers of the climate regime, it
will not come as a surprise that the CBDR/RC principle, which has been
one of the most contentious aspects of the regime since its inception, was
the subject of disagreement when originally negotiated.  Negotiators had
already agreed that “developed countries should take the lead” and that this
concept should follow the sentence setting out the CBDR/RC principle, but
they did not agree on whether developed countries were to take the lead
because of their “responsibilities,” “capabilities,” or both.  The drafting solu-
tion was to begin the sentence with “Accordingly.”3  A Party could then
interpret the basis for the developed countries’ leading role on whichever
aspect of the previous sentence it deemed appropriate.
III. “TAKING INTO ACCOUNT”
Negotiators have frequently made a commitment acceptable by tacking
on the phrase “taking into account.”  The phrase has provided Parties with
flexibility in implementing a commitment and/or built in an implicit sense
of differentiation, particularly where it might have otherwise appeared that
all Parties were expected to take the same kind of action.
Article 4 of the Convention (the “commitments” article) contains two
significant examples:
• Article 4.1, which applies to all Parties, includes in its chapeau
the very broad phrase “taking into account their common but
differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and re-
gional development priorities, objectives and circumstances.”4
The phrase acts as an overlay with respect to all of the topics
and subparagraphs that follow.
• Article 4.2, which addresses the mitigation policies and mea-
sures of Annex I Parties only, contains an even more extensive
2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4.2, opened for sig-
nature June 4, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC],
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
3. Id. art. 3.1.
4. Id. art. 4.1.
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“taking into account” proviso: “taking into account the differ-
ences in these Parties’ starting points and approaches, economic
structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and
sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other
individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and
appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the global
effort regarding that objective.”5  Given the wide range of situa-
tions among the Annex I Parties, it was important to many
countries to flag their differences.
The phrase has also been used as part of an instruction to Parties for
future work.  For example, one of the controversial issues during the negoti-
ation of the Kyoto Protocol was how the removal of greenhouse gases from
the atmosphere by “sinks” would be counted against a Party’s emissions of
greenhouse gases.  The Protocol’s directive to the first meeting of the Kyoto
Parties reflected the controversial and complex nature of the issue; it asked
the Parties to determine the accounting rules, “taking into account uncer-
tainties, transparency in reporting, verifiability, the methodological work of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the advice provided by
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in accordance
with Article 5 and the decisions of the Conference of the Parties.”6
IV. “PARTIES” VS. “STATES”
The Convention’s article on “principles” was controversial on multiple
grounds, including whether there should even be such an article.  Some
countries were concerned that, were it included, it might be viewed as re-
flecting an intention to codify customary international law or to be broadly
applicable to all countries, even those that did not end up joining the Con-
vention.  One bridging device between those favoring an article and those
concerned about it was to change the original subject of the provisions from
“States” to “Parties,” thereby clarifying that the provisions were not in-
tended to reflect customary international law or be generally applicable to
non-Party States.7
5. Id. art. 4.2(a).
6. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
art. 3.4, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], https://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf; see also id. art. 10.
7. See UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 3. R
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V. REVISITING
Another means of resolving issues has been to allow one point of view
to prevail for the moment, but to provide for the issue in question to be
revisited.
For example, a major issue during the negotiation of the Convention
was whether it should contain a legally binding emissions target for Annex I
Parties.  The compromise was to make the year 2000 emissions “aim” non-
legally binding, but to direct the first meeting of the Parties to the Conven-
tion (the so-called “Conference of the Parties” or “COP”) to review the
“adequacy” of the relevant provisions.8
The Copenhagen Accord, for example, reflects an intention to revisit
the global temperature goal.  Most Parties supported the inclusion of a goal
expressed as holding the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees
Celsius, while some fought hard to make the goal 1.5 degrees Celsius.  The
Accord adopts the former view but calls for a subsequent assessment of the
implementation of the Accord, which would include “consideration of
strengthening the long-term goal referencing various matters presented by
the science, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees
Celsius.”9
VI. REVERSING THE ORDER
Sometimes a disagreement has been resolved by changing the emphasis.
For example, during the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, delegates hotly
debated whether (and, if so, to what extent) Parties would be permitted to
use allowances from international emissions trading to help meet their
emissions targets.  Some considered the inclusion of an article allowing
trading to be absolutely essential, while others either opposed it entirely or
could support it only if trading were subject to heavy regulation under the
Protocol.  Several drafts of the article had begun with “authorizing” lan-
guage (making clear that Parties were free to engage in trading), before
referring to any rules that might limit such trading.  In order to gain wide
acceptance, though, the final text switched the order of the two ideas.  It
provided: “The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant princi-
8. Id. art. 4.2(d).  Although the first meeting of the Parties did end up finding the
provisions inadequate and called for the negotiation of a new instrument, it was not until
their second meeting that most Parties expressed the view that the next set of targets—which
became Kyoto Protocol targets—should be legally  binding. See UNFCCC Conference of the
Parties, FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, Annex, ¶ 8, The Geneva Ministerial Declaration (1996).
9. See UNFCCC Conference of the Parties Dec. 2/CP.15, ¶¶ 2, 12, Copenhagen Ac-
cord (2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/
eng/11a01.pdf.
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ples, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, report-
ing and accountability for emissions trading.  The Parties included in Annex
I may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their
commitments under Article 3.”10
Beginning with the potential constraints on emissions trading (i.e., de-
fining the applicable “principles, modalities, rules and guidelines”) and only
then setting out the authorizing language (i.e., the Parties “may participate
in emissions trading”), provided a balance that was palatable for both sides.
VII. LESS IS MORE
Negotiators have often been amenable to having their proposals de-
leted, provided the proposals of others were also deleted (an approach
sometimes jokingly referred to as “mutually assured deletions”).  The draft
preamble to the Kyoto Protocol, for example, contained a long list of sug-
gested elements, many of which were contradictory.  The solution was to
delete almost all of them, leaving only a handful of references to the Con-
vention and the mandate for the negotiations.11
VIII. SENDING IT ELSEWHERE
Sometimes the solution to a disagreement has been to request another
body or organization to address it.  For example, the Parties to the Conven-
tion had been unable to agree on how to attribute, as among them, the
emissions from bunker fuels used in international transport.  During the
negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, rather than seek to resolve the issue,
negotiators decided to send to the International Civil Aviation Organization
and the International Maritime Organization, respectively, the homework
of addressing greenhouse gas emissions from aviation and marine bunker
fuels.12
IX. SAYING WHAT, NOT WHY
Negotiators have on occasion resolved an issue by focusing solely on
which Parties agree to do what—and omitting the underlying rationale for
those actions.
During the negotiation of the Convention, there was a push from some
developing countries to spell out why so-called “Annex II” Parties (consist-
ing of the Annex I Parties minus the former Soviet Republics and Eastern
European countries) were committing to provide certain financial support
10. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, art. 17. R
11. Id. pmbl.
12. Id. art. 2.2.
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to developing countries.  They thought it was important to make clear that
this commitment flowed from the “historical responsibility” of such coun-
tries for emitting greenhouse gases.  Annex II Parties, on the other hand,
considered that they were agreeing to pay for certain developing country
actions because they had the capacity to do so.  In fact, they rejected the
notion of “historical responsibility.”  The solution was to simply state the
facts—X Parties agree to do Y—without any reasons attached.  If certain
Parties chose to go home and explain the provision in a particular way, they
could do so, but without textual back-up.13
As another example, the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance regime was de-
signed to have two branches: a facilitative branch and an enforcement
branch.14  Everyone agreed that the facilitative branch would apply to all
Parties and that the enforcement branch would apply only to Annex I Par-
ties.  Negotiators strongly disagreed, however, on why this was the case.
Some developing countries took the position that, as a matter of principle,
only Annex I Parties could be subjected to a stringent compliance review.
Annex I Parties, on the other hand, considered that it was appropriate for
them to be reviewed by an enforcement branch because:
• their commitments involved quantitative targets, the achieve-
ment of which could be objectively assessed—while the qualita-
tive commitments of developing countries could not; and
• given that Annex I targets could be met through the use of
emissions trading, an enforcement regime was important for the
environmental integrity of the system (e.g., to ensure that Par-
ties were not selling allowances if they were exceeding their
targets).
The compliance regime left the reasons for the two-track system unstated,
leaving Parties free to explain it in their own ways.15
X. “INTER ALIA”
The phrase “inter alia” has been inserted in several cases when there was
no agreement to include a particular proposal in a listing and the propo-
nent(s) would not agree to an exhaustive list:
13. See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 4.3. R
14. See UNFCCC Conference of the Parties Dec. 27/CMP.1, Annex, arts. IV–V, Pro-
cedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocol (2006), http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a03.pdf.
15. See id.
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• During the negotiation of the “principles” article of the Conven-
tion, negotiators could not agree on the proposed inclusion of a
principle related to science.  In exchange, “inter alia” was added
to the chapeau, making clear that the list of principles was an
open one.16
• The “Berlin Mandate,” the product of the first meeting of the
Conference of the Parties, was to set out the negotiating instruc-
tions for the instrument that became the Kyoto Protocol.  A
sticking point was whether to include in the list of objectives a
specific reference to international market mechanisms, such as
emissions trading.  The solution was to add “inter alia” to the
chapeau, making the list non-exhaustive and precluding the po-
tential argument during the negotiating process that ideas not
on the list could not be raised.17
• In a related vein, negotiators of the 2011 “Durban Platform,”
which laid out the instructions for what became the Paris Agree-
ment, could not agree on a closed list of topics for the negotia-
tions and therefore provided that the negotiating group was to
plan its work “including, inter alia, on mitigation, adaptation,
finance,” etc.18
• At the 2014 Conference of the Parties in Lima, negotiators were
charged with developing a list of the types of information that
Parties might submit along with their emissions targets in order
to promote clarity.  Certain proposals were opposed, including
one related to whether a Party expected to use market mecha-
nisms, such as international emissions trading, to help achieve
its target.  Because the provision was phrased permissively (i.e.,
Parties “may” include such information), there was some con-
cern that it might be read to mean that Parties could not submit
types of clarifying information that did not appear on the list.19
16. See UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 3. R
17. See UNFCCC Conference of Parties Dec. 1/CP.1, ¶ 1, The Berlin Mandate: Re-
view of the Adequacy of Article 4, Paragraph 2 (a) and (b), of the Convention, Including
Proposals Related to a Protocol and Decisions on Follow-Up (1995), https://unfccc.int/re-
source/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf.
18. See UNFCCC Conference of Parties Dec. 1/CP.17, ¶ 5, Establishment of an Ad
Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (2011) [hereinafter Dur-
ban Platform], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf.
19. See UNFCCC Conference of Parties Dec. 1/CP.20, ¶ 14, Lima Call for Climate
Action (2014) [hereinafter Lima Conference of the Parties], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2014/cop20/eng/10a01.pdf.
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The inclusion of “inter alia” made clear that that was not the
case.
The English relative of “inter alia”—“including but not limited to”—has
also been used liberally to resolve disagreements over listings.  A recent
example related to the Paris Agreement’s call for the Parties to review their
progress every five years (the so-called “global stocktake”).20  The question
was what types of information the Parties would consider as part of the
global stocktake.  The negotiators created a non-exhaustive list of such
“sources of input” through an “including, but not limited to” clause.21
XI. COMMAS
The comma, the most surgical of all drafting devices, has played an
active role in climate negotiations.
An early example is from the negotiation of the Convention, specifi-
cally concerning the reference to sustainable development.  During the
drafting of what became the article on “principles,” some countries advo-
cated the inclusion of a “right to sustainable development.”  Other countries
did not recognize such a right.  The originally proposed sentence provided
that the Parties “have a right to, and should promote, sustainable develop-
ment.”  By moving the comma to sit in front of the word “promote,” instead
of after, negotiators were able to create a sentence that worked for everyone.
It read: “The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable devel-
opment.”22  It then meant that the Parties have a right to promote sustaina-
ble development—and they should do so.  The sentence gave enough to
proponents without crossing the “red lines” of opponents.
A comma was at the heart of the deal coming out of the 2007 COP in
Bali.  Negotiators were designing the mandate for the next stage of the
climate regime.  For this effort to succeed, it was essential to bring into the
process the two largest emitting States: the United States, which had not
joined Kyoto but was now ready to re-engage in negotiations under the
Convention, and China, which had joined Kyoto but, as a “non-Annex I”
Party, did not have any specific emissions commitments.
Much effort had gone into constructing balanced paragraphs with re-
spect to the mitigation efforts of developed and developing countries.  As
20. See Paris Agreement art. 14(2), Dec. 12, 2015 [hereinafter Paris Agreement], https:/
/unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement
.pdf.
21. UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Dec. 1/CP.21, ¶ 99, Adoption
of the Paris Agreement (2015) [hereinafter Paris Conference of the Parties], http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf.
22. See UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 3.4. R
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noted below (under “parallelism”), the mitigation actions of both developed
and developing countries would be “measurable, reportable, and verifiable.”
In the developed country paragraph, these adjectives were placed at the
beginning: “Measurable, reportable, and verifiable . . . mitigation commit-
ments or actions.”23  In the developing country paragraph, they stood at the
end: “ . . . mitigation actions . . . , supported and enabled by technology,
financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable
manner.”24
The adjectives were moved to the end at the request of certain develop-
ing country delegates, who sought to have them apply to technology, fi-
nancing, and capacity-building (i.e., the support for mitigation actions).
For developed countries, it was vital on both substantive and parallelism
grounds that the adjectives applied to the mitigation actions themselves.
The comma before “in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner” was
therefore a critical element of the paragraph; otherwise, the adjectives
would logically be read to apply only to support for actions and not to the
mitigation actions themselves.
At the Durban COP in 2011, there was widespread agreement that the
new instrument to be negotiated should be “rules-based.”  However, discus-
sions were ongoing concerning the extent to which rules should be multilat-
erally agreed versus nationally-derived.  The preamble to the Durban
Platform thus referred to the need for strengthening the “multilateral, rules-
based regime under the Convention.”25  The comma between “multilateral”
and “rules-based” made clear that the regime would be multilateral, as well
as rules-based, but did not say that the rules would be multilateral—which
would have been the case without the comma.
XII. PARALLELISM
As noted, the Bali negotiators aimed to bring both the United States
and China into the next phase of the climate regime.  In this regard, the
main issue was the extent to which the mandate would reflect differentia-
tion between “Annex I” and “non-Annex I” Parties (or between “developed”
and “developing” countries).
In terms of both substance and optics, the United States sought a single
paragraph addressing the mitigation mandate relevant to all Parties.
Others, including China, insisted upon a clear distinction, both substan-
23. See UNFCCC Conference of Parties Dec.1/CP.13, ¶ 1(b)(i), Bali Action Plan
(2007) [hereinafter Bali Action Plan], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01
.pdf.
24. Id. ¶ 1(b)(ii).
25. See Durban Platform, supra note 18, pmbl., para. 4. R
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tively and optically, between two categories, whether based on the Conven-
tion’s Annex I or developed/developing countries.
The compromise was to have two separate paragraphs with a substantial
amount of parallel content:
• The mitigation efforts of both developed and developing coun-
tries were described as “nationally appropriate.”
• The mitigation efforts of both developed and developing coun-
tries would be “measurable, reportable, and verifiable.”
• While a distinction was drawn between the type of efforts to be
considered for developing countries (“actions”) versus for devel-
oped countries (“commitments or actions”), the “or” made clear
that the Bali mandate could be fulfilled by considering only “ac-
tions” for developed countries.26
XIII. DE FACTO
Sometimes an approach to problem-solving has not even been visible in
the resulting agreement.
In Copenhagen, when countries determined that it was simply too late
to list their respective emissions targets/actions in the Accord, they agreed
to give themselves a few months to make submissions.  This delay raised
the question of how a country could ensure, in making its submission, that
other “key” countries would also make submissions.  Given the backdrop of
the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries, including the United States, were
not interested in an instrument that included only developed countries.
They wanted to ensure that, at a minimum, the major developing countries
participated.  However, major developing countries opposed any sub-divid-
ing of the category of “developing countries,” such that, for example, those
with higher levels of emissions would be expected to make a submission.
Further, attempts to ensure that the Accord would only enter into effect
once a particular threshold of emissions from both developed and develop-
ing countries had been met were not accepted.
As a result, several countries worked behind the scenes to ensure that
the countries whose participation they considered critical were also plan-
ning to make submissions.  Although the text of the Copenhagen Accord
does not reveal it, this choreography resulted in the de facto participation of
all the major economies, including both developed and developing counties.
26. See Bali Action Plan, supra note 23, ¶ 1(b)(i)–(ii). R
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XIV. CHANGING THE SUBJECT
Problem-solving at the Cancun Conference of the Parties in 2010 neces-
sitated changing the subject of the sentence.
The Cancun meeting followed the previous year’s meeting in Copenha-
gen, where the Parties (with a few exceptions) had agreed on the Copenha-
gen Accord.  The Accord used different verbs for Annex I vs. non-Annex I
Parties; i.e., it provided that Annex I Parties “commit” to implement their
mitigation pledges and that non-Annex I Parties “will” implement theirs.27
In Cancun, it had been agreed that the decision text would refer, sepa-
rately, to the pledges that Annex I and non-Annex I Parties had signed up
to implement.  Annex I Parties sought to avoid perpetuating the use of two
verbs in the Cancun outcome, lest they be interpreted differently.  If the
subjects of the two relevant provisions were different—“Annex I Parties”
and “non-Annex I Parties”—it might have been difficult to avoid repeating
the Copenhagen verbs.
The solution was to start both sentences with the same subject, namely
the “Conference of the Parties” (COP).  That then allowed the verbs (“takes
note of”) to be identical.  Thus, the developed country sentence provided
that the COP “takes note of quantified economy-wide emission reduction
targets to be implemented by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention
as communicated by them and contained in document FCCC/SB/2011/
INF.14 (to be issued),” and the developing country sentence provided that
the COP “takes note of nationally appropriate mitigation actions to be im-
plemented by Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention as commu-
nicated by them and contained in document FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/
INF.15 (to be issued).”28
XV. FOOTNOTES
Referring to the Parties’ various mitigation pledges in Cancun also re-
quired finessing an issue through the use of a footnote.  As noted above,
negotiators sought to refer to the pledges that had been made by Parties
under the Copenhagen Accord.  They were housed in two so-called “INF”
(for “information”) documents, one for Annex I Parties and one for non-
Annex I Parties.  The handful of countries that had opposed the Accord,
preventing it from being formally adopted in Copenhagen, refused to recog-
nize the INF documents and considered any reference to them to be illegiti-
27. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 9, arts. 4–5. R
28. See UNFCCC Conference of the Parties Dec. 1/CP.16, ¶¶ 36, 49, The Cancun
Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Coopera-
tive Action Under the Convention (2010) [hereinafter Cancun Agreements], http://unfccc
.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf.
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mate.  Failure to recognize Copenhagen pledges would have been highly
problematic, because an objective of the Cancun COP was to give more
formal status to such pledges than the not-officially-adopted Copenhagen
Accord had been able to achieve.
After many hours of deliberation, negotiators hit upon a solution.  They
would refer to the INF documents in the text of the decision but would
add, in a footnote, that “[p]arties’ communications to the secretariat that are
included in the information document are considered communications
under the Convention.”29  Thus, the pledges were deemed to be communi-
cations under the Convention, not only under the Copenhagen Accord, and
could therefore be recognized by those that had opposed the Accord.
XVI. “WITHOUT PREJUDICE”
Particularly when negotiations span several years, countries have some-
times been concerned that taking a particular decision, or using a particular
word, might prejudice their positions in the longer term.
For example, at the Warsaw Conference of the Parties, two years before
the expected conclusion of the Paris Agreement, an issue arose concerning
the noun that would be used to describe what ultimately became known as
nationally determined “contributions.”  Negotiators were nearly set to call
them nationally determined “commitments.”  At the last minute, however,
some delegates took the position that “commitments” are, by definition, le-
gally binding.
Those who either were opposed to legally binding emissions targets or
wanted to keep open the question of their legal character objected to the use
of the term.  On the other hand, those supporting legally binding emissions
targets were concerned that the use of the substitute “contributions” might
give the impression that it had already been agreed that targets would not
be legally binding.  The solution was to use the word “contributions” but
accompany it with the phrase “without prejudice to the legal nature of the
contributions.”30
In the year between Warsaw and Paris, at the Lima Conference of the
Parties, negotiators were still debating whether the scope of an “intended
nationally determined contribution” (INDC) was limited to mitigation or
included more elements, such as adaptation, finance, etc.  Because the Lima
decision leaned in the direction of suggesting that such contributions were
to be mitigation-focused, the decision also provided that “the arrangements”
29. See id. ¶¶ 36 n.4, 49 n.5.
30. See UNFCCC Conference of the Parties Dec. 1/CP.19, ¶ 2(b)–(c), Further En-
hancing the Durban Platform (2013) [hereinafter Warsaw Conference of the Parties], http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf.
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specified in the decision were “without prejudice” to, among other things,
“the content” of INDCs and “the content” of the future Paris agreement.31
The Lima decision also contained a “no prejudice” clause with respect
to the future form of the Paris outcome.  There had been no decision yet on
whether the agreement would be a “protocol” or other type of agreement.  If
it was to be a protocol, Article 17 of the Convention provided that the
secretariat was to communicate the text to Parties at least six months before
the Paris session.  The Parties sought to meet this deadline, just in case, but
those not supporting a protocol did not want to suggest that, by calling for
the secretariat to circulate the text, they had decided on a protocol.  The
request to the secretariat therefore noted that its communication of the text
“will not prejudice” whether the outcome would be a “protocol, another legal
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force.”32
XVII. FINDING THE “JUST RIGHT” ADJECTIVE
At the 2013 Warsaw COP, there was emerging agreement that Parties
would put forward their “nationally determined contributions” (in essence,
their emissions targets) in advance of the Paris Conference.  The idea was
to subject targets to the sunlight, giving other Parties and civil society an
opportunity to see them well before Paris, and, in so doing, inspire Parties
to put their best foot forward.  However, there was disagreement about how
to characterize these previews:
• For some Parties, there would be no distinction between the
preview version of their contribution and the final version; the
contribution was not to be negotiated with other Parties or oth-
erwise changed.  Those Parties favored no adjective before “na-
tionally determined contributions.”
• For others, it was important to at least leave open the possibility
that previewed contributions might ultimately change, such as
in response to questions seeking clarification of a target or even
in response to pressure to increase the level of ambition.  Those
Parties favored an adjective making clear the provisional nature
of the preview, such as “proposed” contributions.  To the other
Parties, this suggested too little finality, as if the contributions
needed to be somehow approved by others.
31. See Lima Conference of the Parties, supra note 19, ¶ 8. R
32. See id. ¶ 7 (citing the trilogy from the Durban Platform mandate).
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The Goldilocks “just right” solution was to call the contributions “in-
tended,” with the perfect flavor of not necessarily absolutely final but also
not up for negotiation with, or approval by, other Parties.33
XVIII. USING THE PREAMBLE
The preamble has frequently been the salvation of provisions that nego-
tiators could not agree to place in the operative provisions of an instrument.
In the Paris Agreement, for example, while many Parties supported the
inclusion of a reference to human rights in the body of the Agreement (spe-
cifically in Article 2, which lays out the Agreement’s aims), others did not.
The solution was to reference human rights in the preamble.34
XIX. PASSIVE VOICE
The passive voice has come in handy in order to avoid litigating an
issue in more than one negotiating forum and/or addressing it in more than
once place in the text.  For example, a major issue during the negotiation of
the Paris Agreement was which Parties would be expected to provide finan-
cial and other forms of support to developing countries to assist in their
implementation.  The issue was being addressed in the finance negotiations.
Some developing countries sought to include references to support in the
other articles of the agreement, such as mitigation, in order to provide reas-
surance that various efforts of developing countries would be supported.
However, there was reluctance on the part of donors to engage in the “who
pays” debate in multiple fora.  They were also concerned about potentially
inconsistent references to finance in various articles of the Agreement.  The
passive voice (“[s]upport shall be provided . . . in accordance with Arti-
cles . . .”), which avoided a subject of the sentence, allowed for the inclusion
of the reassurance, while leaving the question of the providers of support to
the finance negotiating forum and the finance article of the Agreement.35
XX. PUTTING IT OFF
Climate negotiators have often “resolved” issues by not resolving them,
i.e., by postponing the discussion/resolution to a later time.  Sometimes the
issue was not urgent and could safely be left until the future; for example,
most of the Kyoto Protocol’s rules were put off, given that the Protocol was
adopted in 1997, and the commitment period was not to begin until 2008.36
33. See Warsaw Conference of the Parties, supra note 30, ¶ 2(b). R
34. See Paris Agreement, supra note 20, pmbl., para. 12. R
35. Id. art. 4.5; see also id. arts. 7.13, 13.14–.15.
36. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6. R
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At times, however, issues have been put off because there was no agree-
ment.  For example, delegates to the Framework Convention negotiations
could not agree on whether, in addition to the inclusion of traditional bilat-
eral dispute settlement procedures, they should establish a multilateral pro-
cedure to address questions regarding the implementation of the
Convention.  They elected to direct the first COP to “consider” the estab-
lishment of such a process.37
As another example, negotiators could not agree on a common time
frame for mitigation targets in the Paris Agreement.  In the run-up to Paris,
countries had submitted initial targets in both the 2025 and 2030
timeframes.  In Paris, some countries sought a provision making clear that,
post-2030, all Parties would need to set targets in the same time frame
(such as every five years).  Others either disagreed that there would ever be
a need for harmonization or disagreed on what the harmonized time frame
should be.  As a result, delegates agreed instead that the Parties to the
Agreement were to consider common time frames at their first meeting.38
XXI. SMALL LETTER
On at least once occasion, negotiators addressed a challenge through the
use of a small letter.  At COP 17 in Durban, certain Parties sought to estab-
lish a formal institution to address the impacts of response measures, i.e.,
impacts that arise from measures taken to address climate change, as op-
posed to impacts arising from climate change itself.  Other Parties were not
enthusiastic about agreeing to establish a body or institution that was either
too formal or too permanent.  The compromise was to create “a forum” (as
opposed to “a Forum” or “The Forum”) on the impact of the implementa-
tion of response measures and to call for a future session to review “the
need for its continuation.”39
XXII. “FOR SOME”
There has often been widespread agreement to include a particular
phrase in an instrument.  In the Paris Agreement, for example, negotiators
were able to agree on the inclusion of a reference to “a just transition.”40
37. UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 13.  While the Parties came close to establishing such R
a process, they never did.  Disagreement concerning, inter alia, the composition of the body
that would address questions of implementation prevented consensus.
38. Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4.10. R
39. UNFCCC Conference of the Parties Dec. 8/CP.17, ¶ 5, Forum and Work Pro-
gramme on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures (2011), http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a02.pdf#page=9 .
40. Paris Agreement, supra note 20, pmbl., para. 11. R
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However, there have also been occasions where a few countries have sought
to include a particular phrase, while other countries have not necessarily
wanted to be associated with that phrase.  The Paris Agreement’s preamble
contains two such examples: “Mother Earth” and “climate justice.”  In both
cases, the solution was to include the phrase but to make clear at the same
time that not necessarily all Parties embrace the concept:
• In the case of “Mother Earth,” it is “recognized by some
cultures.”41
• In the case of “climate justice,” the preamble notes the “impor-
tance of the concept for some.”42
XXIII. SELF-SELECTION
One of the more controversial proposals during recent climate negotia-
tions has been the formulation “Parties in a position to . . . .”  Although the
phrase was not necessarily intended to create an objective standard, that is
how some negotiators perceived it.  They were concerned that others might
attempt to judge whether a Party was or was not “in a position to” do X or
Y.  In the run-up to Paris, the phrase was associated with proposals related
to the provision of financial resources.  However, it initially came up during
discussions at the Warsaw Conference of the Parties about previewing na-
tionally determined contributions.
Negotiators had largely agreed that Parties would be invited to submit
their contributions “well in advance” of the Paris COP, but there was an
additional proposal to the effect that Parties “in a position to do so” would
be invited to submit theirs even earlier, i.e., by March 31st of that year.
Several delegates expressed concern.  When the word “ready” was offered as
a substitute for the offending “in a position,” it was quickly accepted.  It was
considered more self-judging than “in a position to . . .” because it would be
difficult for others to second-guess a Party’s readiness.43
XXIV. AVOIDING PARTICULAR WORDS
Particular words have often caused problems for certain countries,
whether for domestic political reasons, ideological reasons, or otherwise.
Work-arounds have often been necessary.
During the negotiation of the Paris Agreement, for example, many
countries supported the inclusion of provisions on the use of “markets” in
relation to implementing emissions targets.  However, for a few countries,
41. Id. pmbl., para. 14.
42. Id.
43. Warsaw Conference of the Parties, supra note 30, ¶ 2(b). R
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that term was unacceptable.  The solution was to draft an article that clearly
addresses markets but without using that word.44
A similar issue arose with respect to setting a long-term emissions goal
in the Paris Agreement.  Many catch phrases had been proposed for the
goal, including “carbon neutrality,” “decarbonization,” “climate neutrality,”
and “net zero emissions.”  However, each proposal raised a problem with
one or more constituencies:
• Word and phrases containing the word “carbon” (such as “decar-
bonization” and “carbon neutrality”) were problematic for oil-
exporting countries, because they focused exclusively on carbon
dioxide.
• Other countries, while not necessarily disagreeing with the con-
cepts of “net zero emissions” or “climate neutrality,” had issues
with those terms.  Some did not like the extreme nature of the
word “zero,” while others did not like the inclusion of the limit-
ing “net.”  Some found the phrase “climate neutrality” too
vague.
The answer was to spell out the long-term goal in terms of substance,
rather than particular terms: “. . . Parties aim . . . to undertake rapid reduc-
tions . . . so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouses gases in the second half of
this century . . . .”45
Finally, it is interesting to note that there has been a distinct allergy to
the word “report” when used as a verb.  Instead, the Parties “communicate”
information under the Convention46 and the Paris Agreement,47 “provide”
information under the Paris Agreement,48 and “submit” information under
the Kyoto Protocol.49
XXV. BORROWING
It has been helpful on occasion to borrow agreed text from other places:
• Borrowings have come from previous COP decisions.  For ex-
ample, the preambular reference in the Paris Agreement to “eq-
44. Instead, the Agreement refers to “cooperative approaches that involve the use of
internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards nationally determined contribu-
tions.” Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 6.2. R
45. Id. art 4.1.
46. See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 12.1. R
47. See, e.g., Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.5. R
48. See, e.g., id. art. 13.7.
49. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, art. 7.3. R
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uitable access to sustainable development” lifts that phrase from
previously agreed language in the decision adopted at the
Cancun COP in 2010.50
• There have also been important examples of borrowing from
bilateral statements, particularly those between the United
States and China.  For example:
° Negotiators at the Lima COP in 2014 broke a logjam on the
contentious issue of how to refer to the principle of “com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities and respective capa-
bilities” by adopting the formulation agreed in the U.S.-
China Joint Announcement a month earlier (i.e., “common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,
in light of different national circumstances”).51
° The Paris Agreement itself also used certain formulations
from the 2015 U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement, such
as agreement that the transparency regime under the Agree-
ment would afford flexibility to “those” developing countries
that need it in light of their “capacities.”52
XXVI. TITLES
At least two debates over the years have involved the titles of articles:
• During the negotiation of the Convention, the articles had
working titles.  Article 3 was titled “principles.”  Paragraph 3 of
that article, which had been agreed, included what many coun-
tries referred to as the “precautionary principle.”  The United
States, while embracing the substance of the paragraph, did not
agree that it was a “principle” (characterizing it instead as the
precautionary “approach”).  As such, the United States consid-
ered that titling the article “principles” would be prejudicial to
its view.  One possible solution, namely to delete all titles, was
opposed, because many countries thought it would be easier to
understand the Convention if the articles had titles.  Instead,
50. Compare Cancun Agreements, supra note 28, ¶ 6, with Paris Agreement, supra note R
20, pmbl. R
51. Compare Lima Conference of the Parties, supra note 19, ¶ 3, with Press Release, The R
White House, U.S.–China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, ¶ 2 (Nov. 11, 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-cli-
mate-change.
52. Compare Press Release, U.S.–China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate
Change (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-china-
joint-presidential-statement-climate-change, with Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 13.2. R
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negotiators included a footnote at the beginning of the Conven-
tion providing that “[t]itles of articles are included solely to as-
sist the reader.”53
• During the negotiation of the Paris Agreement, there was an
issue concerning the relationship between “adaptation” and “loss
and damage.”  At the Warsaw COP in 2013, delegates had pro-
visionally resolved the issue in favor of placing loss and damage
under the umbrella of adaptation, subject to a review in 2016.54
In Paris, there was a push to create separate articles and clearly
label them “adaptation” and “loss and damage.”  Those seeking
to preserve the notion that loss and damage falls under adapta-
tion, or at least to retain ambiguity on the subject, agreed to
have a separate article addressing loss and damage, provided the
agreement had no titles.  It is for this reason that the Paris
Agreement has no titles.55
XXVII. NON-LEGALLY BINDING
The issue of the legal character of commitments has been at the heart of
many Conferences of the Parties, and the resolution has sometimes been to
take a non-legally binding approach.  The Copenhagen Accord is an ex-
treme example.  Designing the Accord as a completely non-legally binding
instrument was the only way to reconcile, on the one hand, the opposition
by some developing countries to taking on legal commitments themselves
and, on the other hand, the insistence by the United States and certain
other developed countries that they would take on legal commitments only
if such commitments were widely applicable.56
There are many other examples of facilitating agreement at the level of
individual provisions by making them non-legally binding:
• As noted, the Convention’s 1990-levels-by-2000 emissions goal
for Annex I Parties was made non-legally binding in order to
make it acceptable, particularly to the United States.57
• The issue that almost created a breakdown in the final hours of
the Paris Conference involved the legal nature of one of the
53. UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 1 n.1. R
54. UNFCCC Conference of the Parties Dec. 2/CP.19, Warsaw International Mecha-
nism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts (2013), http://unfccc
.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf.
55. Compare Paris Agreement, supra note 20, with Paris Conference of the Parties, supra R
note 21, ¶¶ 41–46 (titled “Adaptation”), and ¶¶ 47–51 (titled “Loss and Damage”). R
56. See generally Copenhagen Accord, supra note 9. R
57. See UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 4.2(b). R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-1\MEA102.txt unknown Seq: 22 12-MAY-17 12:39
58 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 6:1
mitigation provisions.  The legal character of emissions targets
was addressed in Article 4.2, which made clear that such targets
were not legally binding.  A separate provision, Article 4.4, was
intended to address the question whether, recognizing that each
Party’s mitigation contribution would be “nationally deter-
mined” (per Article 4.2), there should nevertheless be certain
expectations concerning the respective contributions of devel-
oped vs. developing countries.  Negotiators had carefully
worked out language to the effect that the expectation regarding
developed countries would be the continuation of economy-wide
absolute emission reduction targets, while that of developing
countries would be to enhance their efforts, with an encourage-
ment to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduc-
tion or limitation targets in light of their different national
circumstances.  Both clauses used the verb “should” and were
non-legally binding.  When the “final” version of the Agreement
was issued, however, the verb attached to the developed country
phrase had been switched to “shall.”  This change, of mysterious
origin, not only would have made the developed country clause
legally binding, but would have created a distinction between
the legal nature of the developed country and developing coun-
try clauses.  Neither of these results would have been acceptable
to the United States, among others.  Once the error was cor-
rected and the proper verb reinstated, the adoption of the
Agreement was able to move forward.58
• Another example from the Paris Agreement involved the sub-
mission of adaptation communications.  There was an early push
from some Parties to create legal parallelism between mitigation
and adaptation, such that Parties would be required to submit
communications in both areas.  Ultimately, however, while there
was support for mandatory mitigation communications, there
was insufficient support to make adaptation communications
mandatory.  The solution was to provide that each Party
“should, as appropriate, submit . . . an adaptation
communication . . . .”59
58. See Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4.4. R
59. Id. art. 7.10.
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XXVIII. “VOLUNTARY”
In several cases, even where it was already clear from the word “may”
that a Party could freely choose whether or not to undertake X, emphasizing
the notion of voluntariness provided the necessary comfort to reach agree-
ment.  For example:
• In the Convention, developing country Parties may, “on a vol-
untary basis,” propose projects for financing.60
• In the Copenhagen Accord, the mitigation paragraph relevant to
developing countries provides that least developed countries
and small island developing States “may undertake actions
voluntarily.”61
• In the Paris Agreement’s finance article, Parties other than de-
veloped countries are “encouraged to provide or continue to pro-
vide such support voluntarily.”62
XXIX. DECISION INSTEAD OF AGREEMENT
One of the most frequently used devices for resolving differences has
been to reflect provisions in the “decision” adopted by the Conference of the
Parties, rather than in the agreement itself.  Placement in the decision has
not necessarily related to legal character, as a provision in an agreement can
be non-legally binding and a provision in a decision can be legally binding
(assuming an adequate legal hook in the agreement).  Rather, it has often
been the lower-profile nature of the decision that provided the way out.
For example, at the end of the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, the
United States introduced a proposal to exclude emissions from certain inter-
national military operations from Parties’ national totals.  While the sub-
stance of the proposal was not necessarily controversial, there was a certain
amount of resistance to addressing military-related issues in the text of the
Protocol itself.  The solution was to include the exclusion in a decision on
“methodological issues.”63
Two significant features of the Paris outcome were included in the deci-
sion accompanying the Agreement:
• Developed countries were amenable to continuing through 2025
the goal that had been agreed in Copenhagen, namely a collec-
60. Id. art. 12.4.
61. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 9, ¶ 5. R
62. Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.2. R
63. UNFCCC Conference of the Parties Dec. 2/CP.3, ¶ 5, Methodological Issues Re-
lated to the Kyoto Protocol (1997), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf.
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tive goal of mobilizing $100 billion a year by 2020 to address the
needs of developing countries, in the context of meaningful mit-
igation actions and transparency on implementation.  However,
they were averse to including quantified figures in the Agree-
ment itself.  As a result, the continuation of the goal is reflected
in the decision.64
• A core aspect of the deal that enabled inclusion of the subject of
“loss and damage” in the Paris Agreement was a clear statement
that it did not involve liability or compensation.  Because some
countries were sensitive about including the statement in the
Agreement itself, and because the statement would not be weak-
ened substantively by its placement, negotiators agreed to ad-
dress the issue in the decision.65
XXX. INCREMENTALISM
With respect to certain issues, countries have made themselves more
and more comfortable with a particular concept over time, dropping the
qualifiers along the way.
Taking the example of the global temperature goal, the Convention
does not specify a quantitative goal.  Its objective is qualitative, i.e., “stabili-
zation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.”66
As science advanced, the issue arose whether and, if so, how to reflect a
translation of the Convention’s qualitative language into a quantitative goal.
The Major Economies Forum (“MEF”) grappled with the question in July,
2009, in the run-up to the Copenhagen Conference.  As there was no con-
sensus to adopt a goal at that point, the Declaration of the MEF Leaders
instead included a recognition of “the scientific view that the increase in
global average temperature above pre-industrial levels ought not to exceed 2
degrees C.”67
The Copenhagen Accord took the issue a few steps further.  Like the
MEF Declaration, it recognized the “scientific view”; however, its charac-
terization of the view was that the increase in global temperature should be
64. Paris Conference of the Parties, supra note 21, ¶ 53. R
65. Id. ¶ 51.
66. UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 2. R
67. MAJOR ECONOMIES FORUM ON ENERGY AND CLIMATE, L’AQUILA DECLARATION OF THE
LEADERS (2009), http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/past-meetings/the-first-leaders-meet
ing.html
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“below” 2 degrees Celsius.68  In addition, the Accord reflected a version of a
global temperature goal, specifically that deep cuts in global emissions were
required and, citing the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, “with a view to
reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature
below 2 degrees Celsius.”69  As noted above, the Accord, in a separate place,
called for future consideration of strengthening the goal, with a specific
reference to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
The 2011 Durban COP, for the first time, referred to “below 2 degrees”
and “1.5 degrees” in the alternative:
Noting with grave concern the significant gap between the aggre-
gate effect of Parties’ mitigation pledges in terms of global annual
emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and aggregate emission
pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the in-
crease in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above
pre-industrial levels . . . .70
However, the decision did not establish 1.5 degrees as a new policy
goal.  Rather, the reference to 1.5 was broadly agreeable because it was em-
bedded in a factual statement concerning the relationship between current
efforts and the likelihood of holding the global temperature increase below
that level.
The Paris Agreement moved beyond scientific views and factual state-
ments in relation to global temperature, as well as strengthened the refer-
ence to “well below” 2 degrees:
The Agreement . . . aims to strengthen the global response . . .
including by . . . holding the increase in the global average temper-
ature to well below 2 °C . . . and pursuing efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5 °C . . . .71
XXXI. SEPARATING/CLUSTERING
In some cases, the solution to an impasse has been to separate out a
particular clause or provision.  For example, the Paris Agreement’s preamble
references the least developed countries separately from developing coun-
tries that are particularly vulnerable.  Negotiators from the former felt
strongly that their specific needs and situations with respect to assistance,
68. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 9, ¶ 1. R
69. Id. ¶ 2.
70. Durban Platform, supra note 18, pmbl., para. 3. R
71. Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2.1(a). R
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also referenced in the Convention, warranted separate treatment.72  At the
opposite end of the spectrum, negotiators have on occasion “clustered” vari-
ous provisions together to as to reduce the spotlight on one or more of
them.  For example, the Paris Agreement’s preamble combines about a
dozen different concepts, most related to various “rights,” into one para-
graph.73  In this case, clustering also served to put all the concepts under the
rubric of “their respective obligations on . . . ,” an acknowledgement that not
all Parties have obligations with respect to all the “rights” and other con-
cepts that follow.74
The foregoing examples are by no means a complete survey of the tex-
tual tools used to resolve differences over the course of twenty-five years of
climate change negotiations.  At the same time, they provide a glimpse into
some of the inventive ways in which negotiators have been able to move the
process forward.
As noted, the tools have worked in different ways:
• Many have sidestepped issues, enabling most or all Parties to
preserve their positions.  In some cases, this was done through
imprecision or omission (e.g., constructive ambiguity, less is
more, taking into account, titles, saying what, not why).  In
other cases, it was done through postponing resolution (e.g.,
identifying issues, revisiting, sending it elsewhere, putting it
off) or other means (e.g., footnotes, de facto).
• Some have given confidence to one or more Parties that their
future ability to raise an issue or take a particular position would
not be impaired (e.g., without prejudice, inter alia).
• Some have given Parties the flexibility or other type of comfort
necessary to go along with a particular commitment or provision
(e.g., self-judging, taking into account, non-legally binding,
incrementalism).
• Some have improved the optics for one or more Parties (e.g.,
avoiding particular words, reversing the order, voluntary, deci-
sion rather than agreement, clustering).
• Some have split the difference between competing views (e.g.,
small letter, for some, Parties versus States, parallelism, passive
voice, preamble, “just right” adjective, decision instead of
agreement).
72. See UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 4.9; see also Paris Agreement, supra note 20, pmbl., R
paras. 6–7.
73. See Paris Agreement, supra note 20, pmbl., para. 12. R
74. Id.
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• Commas have been used for a variety of purposes, including the
removal of ambiguity.
While the techniques may not save us from the impacts of climate
change, they contributed to saving several climate conferences and, recog-
nizing that many are unique to the peculiarities of the climate change re-
gime, may inspire the resolution of diplomatic differences in other contexts.
